Identification documents are often used to prove one's identity to strangers or security personnel. In such a situation, the stranger or security personnel is left to assume that the identification document is authentic (i.e., it was produced by a reputable or trusted third-party and it properly identifies the holder of the document). Clearly, the possibility of counterfeit identity documents exists and, as such, the need to combat such counterfeiting is needed, especially if such documents are relied upon for security or access control purposes.
Well-known counterfeit countermeasures exist such as holograms. Indeed, when holograms were first introduced, they effectively prohibited counterfeit identification documents. However, counterfeiting operations have evolved in their complexity to keep up with the countermeasures. Accordingly, the need exists to continue developing counterfeiting countermeasures (e.g., security features) for identification documents and other objects that carry an inherent level of trust.
Identification documents in the form of identification cards (e.g., passports, Secure cards, etc.) are used in a wide array of applications including access control, identification, and financial transfer applications. Such cards vary in complexity and features. Some cards can store digital information and may include embedded Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems, a magnetic strip, optically recordable features or an electronic chip. Secure cards typically consist of a laminate structure including various plastic lamellae and layers, which carry information (e.g., alphanumeric information, logos, and/or a picture of the card holder). As can be appreciated, the security features for these identification cards and laminate structures vary in complexity, cost, and ease of manufacture.
One counterfeit countermeasure approach involves integrating one or more security features with the edge of the card or laminate structure. Typical edge security features include placing special components along the perimeter edge of a card by perforating, printing, or etching directly on the edge of the card. These approaches require modification to individual cards after mass production. Generally, such individual post-production marking approaches are complex and, therefore, cost-prohibitive.
One example of an edge security feature is described in WO2011/070122, the entire contents of which are hereby incorporated by reference. The '122 publication describes configuring a laminated document with a series of holes near an edge of the document. The holes are filled with various colored materials. The colored materials may be transparent, translucent or opaque. By viewing the card edge, tampering or counterfeiting may be detected. Although effective in detecting tampering or counterfeiting, the '122 security feature is not particularly cost-effective from a manufacturing perspective.
WO 2008/110892, the entire contents of which are hereby incorporated herein by reference, discloses a secure identification document comprising two constitution layers, wherein one edge of the identification document is marked with written data etched into the edge by a laser beam. The written data overlap with the constitution layers, to prevent fraudulent document delaminating. The '892 publication is also deficient in that is requires processing the edge of the document directly, which again is cost-prohibitive, difficult, and time-consuming from a manufacturing perspective.
US 2005/087606, the entire contents of which are hereby incorporated herein by reference, discloses a card having non-visible or visible communication markings printed on a perimeter edge surface of a card using an ink jet printer. The markings, e.g. lines of a barcode, are printed on the longest side of the perimeter edge. Much like other prior art references described herein, the '606 publication cannot be implemented very easily or cheaply as it requires printing directly on the perimeter edge.